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The Crain MythA Criticism of the Duree and Stephens
Cases
Henry G. McMahon*
and
Ben R. Miller, Jr.t
The Supreme Court of Louisiana quite recently, in the Dureel
and Stephens2 cases, held that legislative authorization to sue the
state, or an agency, subdivision, or corporation thereof, in an
action ex delicto constituted merely a waiver of immunity from
suit, and did not waive governmental immunity from liability for
the negligence of an employee. Even more alarming was the
further holding that any legislative waiver of this latter immunity would be an unconstitutional exertion of the legislative
power. Article III, § 35, of the Constitution of Louisiana, as
amended in 1946, was held to preclude legislative waiver of this
immunity from liability.
In view of the fact that both before8 and after4 the adoption
of this constitutional amendment a vast majority of all legislative
authorizations for suit against the state, its agencies, subdivisions, and corporations were to permit recovery of damages for
wrongful death, physical injury, or property damage resulting
from the negligence of a governmental employee, a holding that
the constitutional intent was to preclude such suits comes as both
a surprise and a shock. The legislature of Louisiana is placed
in a most embarrassing position by these cases. The most favor*Professor and sometime dean, Louisiana State University Law School.
tAssociate Editor, Louisiana Law Review.
1. Duree v. Maryland Casualty Company, 238 La. 166, 114 So.2d 594 (1959),
reversing Duree v. State, 96 So.2d 854 (La. App. 1957).
2. Stephens v. Natchitoches Parish School Board, 238 La. 388, 115 So.2d 793
(1959), reversing id., 110 So.2d 156 (La. App. 1959). See also Cotton v. Bossier
Parish School Board, 117 So.2d 682 (La. App. 1960).
3. Of the 50 acts authorizing suit against the state or a public body during the
period 1921-1944, 42 sanctioned tort actions to recover damages alleged to have
resulted from the negligence of a governmental employee. See Table 1, infra p.
481.
4. Of the 229 acts and resolutions authorizing suits against the state or a
public body during the period 1946-1959, 211 sanctioned torts actions to recover
damages alleged to have resulted from the negligence of a governmental employee.
See Table 2, infra p. 482.
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able light in which the matter can be regarded, in view of these
211 authorizations for suit ex delicto, is that since 1946 the legislature has been engaged in the practice of extending invitations
to these claimants "to visit the courthouse" 5 briefly for the purpose of instituting suits which would be immediately dismissed
under exceptions of no cause of action. A harsher interpretation
permitted by the Duree and Stephens cases is that since 1946 the
Louisiana legislature has been engaged in the perpetration of a
gigantic and cruel hoax upon these unfortunate claimants.
A close analysis of these two cases indicates that the astonishing conclusions of the Supreme Court were reached - and could
only have been reached - through a syllogism, the major premise
of which was the assumption that one of the purposes of the
1946 constitutional amendment was to overturn the Crain case.6
If the validity of this assumption is once admitted, the remainder
of the syllogism employed is completely valid and unassailable.
The Crain assumption strikingly illustrates the truth of the assertion that if anything is repeated often enough it will eventually win acceptance. It was repeated so often in these cases without
challenge that it was accepted first by the lower courts, and
ultimately by the Bar. The Supreme Court has no responsibility
for the Crain assumption; it was pressed upon the court by both
litigants in both cases.
Yet there is no need to speculate on the validity or invalidity
of the Crain assumption. This constitutional amendment was
adopted less than fourteen years ago, and evidence of the purposes thereof is readily available in the annals of contemporary
history. An examination and presentation of that evidence is
made here. The thesis of this article is that the Crain case had
no more to do with the 1946 constitutional amendment than the
flowers that bloom in the spring.

I. PROLOGUE
The Crain Incident
On July 27, 1931, employees of the State Highway Commission were loading a truck with gravel from a pit in Washington
Parish. Only two members of the group have survived historical
anonymity. It was an unusually hot day, and as Mr. W. Ormond
Crain paused briefly in his work to wipe his brow, he glanced
5. Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1363,
1365 (1954).
6. Crain v. State, 23 So.2d 336 (La. App. 1945).
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admiringly at the regular and rhythmic swing of the shovel
in the hands of Mr. Ben Kennedy, as it picked up gravel from
the pile and sent it unerringly on its way into the truck. Something or someone distracted the attention of Mr. Kennedy. He
made an error which no good golfer ever makes: he failed to
follow through in his swing, and thus lost control over the direction in which his implement traveled. An instant later, a
sharp jolt and a dull thud told Mr. Kennedy his shovel had
landed. A rapidly-spreading splotch of blood on the forehead of
the prostrate Mr. Crain showed where it had landed.
Within a relatively short time Mr. Crain appeared to have
recovered, with the scars of battle the only ill effect of his unfortunate accident. Ten years later, however, he began to complain of severe headaches, which at least one physician diagnosed
as the result of a fracture of the skull from the shovel injury.
For several years Mr. Crain labored under a sense of frustration
almost as painful as the headaches. As a state employee the only
relief to which he was entitled was under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and this remedy was both inadequate and prescribed. Mr. Crain, like Cardinal Wolsey, had cause to be embittered over the base ingratitude of sovereigns. As he brooded,
he was led inevitably to that great American nostrum for all
human faults and failings - "there oughta be a law." In 1944,
he requested and was readily granted legislative authorization
to sue the state to recover damages for the injury sustained
7
through the negligence of his friend, Mr. Kennedy.
His suit for damages was dismissed by the trial court under
the state's exception of no cause of action, based on the contention that his remedy at the time of the accident was exclusively under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and that the
legislature could not thereafter create a new or additional cause
of action. He fared better in the court of appeal, which reversed. 8
A majority of the court held that the legislature could constitutionally provide a remedy which was not available to the claimant at the time of his injury. The late Judge Dor6 dissented
vigorously, admitting that the legislature might waive the state's
immunity from suit, but contending that under the doctrine of
separation of powers it was the exclusive province of the judiciary to determine whether the claimant had a cause of action.
More about the unfortunate Mr. Crain later.
7. La. Acts 1944, No. 341, p. 964.
8. Crain v. State, 23 So.2d 336 (La. App. 1945).
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The Lewis Sisters
During the nineteen thirties and forties no professional lobbyist attended sessions of the Louisiana legislature more regularly
and religiously than the Lewis sisters. Miss Annie, the more
dominant, supplied the drive and was the spokesman for the
two. Miss Agnes provided the necessary moral support, and the
nods of approval when her sister made impassioned appeals to
unfortunate legislators trapped by the two in a corridor of the
Capitol, or the lobby of the Heidelberg Hotel.
The interest of the Lewis sisters in matters legislative and
judicial stemmed from Miss Annie's frustrated ambition to become a lawyer. Miss Agnes just went along for the ride. At
various times of her life Miss Annie had sued members of her
family, 9 the county agent of her parish, the local farm credit
association, its president, and the Federal Land Bank. 10 She
always was her own lawyer, and if she had ever heard the
ancient saw that one who acts as his own attorney has a fool
for a client, she would have brushed it aside as professional
propaganda. If her lawsuits were short on probata, which Miss
Annie regarded as boring trivia, they were long on allegata.
She spent untold hours in drafting lengthy pleadings and briefs,
which were as replete with redundancy, repetition, and hackneyed legal expression as any professional product. Her uniform
lack of success discouraged her not one bit; Miss Annie was a
dedicated woman.
She had not attended too many sessions of the legislature
when she developed an interest in legislative authorizations to
sue the state. These intrigued her, for in them she saw a double
opportunity to gratify her professional ambitions. The wish was
father to the thought. A quarter of a century earlier, she had
been committed for treatment in one of the state's mental institutions. As many another she had resented the implications keenly,
and her stay in the hospital had only been prolonged vi et armis.
Treatment at any mental institution during this dark period was
rugged, and in time she was able to recall vividly the cruel and
inhuman treatment accorded her. Without too much difficulty,
she located several permanent disabilities resulting therefrom.
9. See Succession of Lewis, 215 La. 79, 39 So.2d 830 (1949), certiorari denied
in In re Lewis, 337 U.S. 912 (1949) ; id., 178 La. 227, 151 So. 189 (1933) ; id.,
174 La. 901, 142 So. 121 (1932).
10. The dismissal of the appeal is reported in Lewis v. Federal Land Bank of
New Orleans, 183 La. 724, 164 So. 780 (1935). The facts appear from the pleadings in the transcript, No. 33,460 of the docket of the Supreme Court.
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Because of her congenital distrust of lawyers, Miss Annie
drafted her own bill to obtain legislative authorization for suit.
It was so patently invalid that in 1934, largely as a practical
joke, it was adopted by both Houses." Among its many deficiencies, the resultant act made no provision for the procedure to
be employed in the institution and prosecution of the action
thereby authorized, as required by Article III, § 35, of the Constitution. The suit which she filed was immediately dismissed
by the trial court on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the
authorizing act. After lying fallow in the Supreme Court for
some years, this decision was finally affirmed in 1941.12
The theory of the constitutional mandate over which she had
tripped was that it would allow greater flexibility in the procedural requirements to be adopted by the legislature. This
theory backfired. Actually, it produced both confusion and the
greatest variety of procedures, in those instances when the
draftsman of the bill remembered to insert procedural matter.
Miss Annie was not the only one who had come a cropper over
this constitutional provision. The first Lewis case indicated a
need for a constitutional provision which would both require and
suggest an adequate and uniform procedure for all of these cases.
This was the first reason for the 1946 constitutional amendment.
The Lewis sisters went back to work at the legislative session
of 1942. They found the legislators more cooperative, probably
as a result of legislative contrition over the shabby trick which
had been played on Miss Annie some years before. She was again
authorized to sue the state.'8 Again the suit which she immediately filed was dismissed by the trial court, which sustained
the state's exceptions. This time, however, the Supreme Court
14
reversed and remanded the case to the lower court for trial.
The second Lewis case decided two important points. Firstly,
the court held that when the legislature authorized suit against
the state to recover damages because of the wrongful acts of
the hospital employees, it necessarily waived the state's immunity from liability for these wrongful acts. This made plenty
of sense, and it was followed consistently 15 until the decision in
11. La. Acts 1934, No. 206.
12. Lewis v. State, 196 La. 814, 200 So. 265 (1941), certiorari dismissed, Lewis
v. Louisiana, 312 U.S. 705 (1941), rehearing denied, 313 U.S. 599 (1941).
13. La. Acts 1942, No. 273.
14. Lewis v. State, 207 La. 194, 20 So.2d 917 (1945).
15. Webb v. State, 91 So.2d 156 (La. App. 1956) ; Duree v. State, 96 So.2d
854 (La. App. 1957) ; St. Julian v. State, 82 So.2d 85 (La. App. 1955) ; Marler
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the Duree case. Secondly, the court held that, under the peculiar
language of Article III, § 35, of the Constitution, the legislature - and not the legislature and the Governor - were empowered to authorize suits against the state and to provide the
effect of judgments rendered therein. Suits might be authorized,
and provison made for the payment of judgments rendered, by
legislative resolution which was not subject to veto by the
Governor. This was a bomb loaded with TNT, but this fact was
not noticed until a year later, when it exploded in the faces of
administration leaders in the Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. case. 16
This constitutional provision had never proved workable. The
legislature was not only authorized, but it had a mandate, to
provide, at the time it authorized suit against the state, for the
effect of any judgment subsequently rendered. The state was
thus compelled to sign a blank check at the time suit was authorized, without knowing either the amount or the date it would
be payable. If the judgment was made payable out of the revolving fund made available to the state penitentiary for its
industrial operations, 17 and payment of the judgment when
executory impaired those operations, it was just unfortunate. If
made payable out of funds made available to the Department of
Highways, and payment of the judgment when executory would
impair current operations of the Department to this extent, this
was unfortunate. If the authorizing act provided that any judgment would be paid out of surplus funds, and an unusually large
judgment made heavy inroads on surplus which the state administration was hoarding for a particular future use, this
similarly was unfortunate. In all these case there was a legislative mandate, made some months or years before, which had to
be complied with. The normal constitutional controls over appropriations' did not apply to legislative authorizations for suit
which made provision for the payment of the judgment. Further, the impact of the judgment when it becomes executory
v. State, 78 So.2d 26 (La. App. 1955). Cf. Preuett v. State, 62 So.2d 686 (La.
App. 1953). See also Bordelon v. State, 59 So.2d 231, 235 (La. App. 1952).
16. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. State, No. 22,305 of the docket of the
Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge. This case
is discussed in more detail, infra.
17. As was provided in Senate Bill No. 100 of 1956. See Cobb v. Board of
Institutions, 237 La. 315, 111 So.2d 126 (1958).
18. All appropriations, except those made in the general appropriation bill,
have to be made through separate bills, having but one object. LA. CONST. art.
IV, § 9. All appropriation bills must originate in the House. Id. art. 1II, § 22.
No money may be withdrawn from the treasury except by an appropriation. Id.
art. IV, § 1. The Governor may veto any appropriation bill, including any item
in the general appropriation bill. Id. art. V, §§ 15, 16.
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could not be cushioned by a contingency appropriation made in
advance, as the latter are expressly prohibited. 9 That the system
worked at all during the period 1921-1946 was due to a single
fact. Up until the second Lewis case it had always been assumed
that an authorization to sue the state and which made provision for the payment of any judgment therein could be obtained
only through legislation which was subject to the veto of the
Governor.2 ° That case held to the contrary.
The second, and more important, of the reasons for the adoption of the 1946 constitutional amendment was to overrule that
portion of the second Lewis case, and to prevent the legislature
from making provision for the payment of judgments in these
cases, except through a subsequent legislative appropriation subject to the normal constitutional controls, including the veto
power of the Governor.21
The Sulphur Company Claim
In 1936, the State of Louisiana recovered judgment against
the Jefferson Island Salt Mining Company for $1,165,419.54,
with legal interest from judicial demand.2 2 This suit had been
brought to recover the value of salt extracted by the defendant
under Lake Peigneur, a body of water which had been navigable
in 1812 and the bed of which was owned by the state. Some years
before, the state had executed a mineral lease affecting the bed
of this lake to the assignor of the Jefferson Lake Sulphur Company, under which the mineral lessee was to receive seven-eighths
of all minerals extracted therefrom. The trespass of the Salt
Mining Company on lands subject to this mineral lease had been
called, to the attention of the state by the Sulphur Company; in
fact, the latter's attorneys, engineers, and experts developed the
facts subsequently proven by the state in its suit. The then
Attorney General had agreed with the Sulphur Company that,
19.

LA. CoNST. art. IV, § 10.
20. The brief of the Attorney General in Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. State,
No. 38,490 of the docket of the Supreme Court, was devoted primarily to an
attack on this phase of the second Lewis case, supported by an appendix listing
every legislative authorization for suit against the state from 1874 through 1946,
all of which were legislative acts either signed by the Governor, or which became
law because of his failure to veto timely. A lengthy brief filed by the Attorney
General to support the state's application for a rehearing was devoted exclusively
to this point.
21. On this point, see Cobb v. Board of Institutions, 237 La. 315, 347-350, 111
So.2d 126, 137-138 (on rehearing, 1959).
22. See State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304, 163 So. 145
(1935), certiorari denied in Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co. v. Louisiana, 297
U.S. 716 (1936), rehearing denied, 297 U.S. 729 (1936).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. XX

in the event of recovery, all of the expenses incurred in preparing
the suit for trial and in its litigation would be deducted, and that
the Sulphur Company would receive seven-eighths of the net
balance.
The first suit against the Salt Mining Company was filed by
the state and the Sulphur Company jointly, but this suit was discontinued, 23 and a new suit was filed by the state alone, under
which the recovery was had. There had been a change of state
officers since, and the new Attorney General refused to execute
the agreement made by his predecessor, after the state's judgment was paid in 1936, on the ground that it was illegal. On
March 1, 1939, the Sulphur Company filed suit against the State
Treasurer to recover the sum of $897,465.72, with legal interest
thereon from March 30, 1936; but this suit was dismissed on the
ground that it was actually a suit against the state which could
not be prosecuted without a legislative waiver of the immunity
24
from suit.
In 1940, the Sulphur Company requested legislative permission to sue the state, but in lieu thereof the legislature created
a commission to investigate the facts and submit appropriate
recommendations to the next legislature. 5 The report of this
commission was vague and nebulous in certain respects, and the
only recommendation submitted was that the Sulphur Company
be reimbursed its expenses in preparing the state's suit for trial,
and in the litigation thereof.28 This recommendation, of course,
was completely unacceptable to the Sulphur Company, which
again requested legislative authorization to sue, but no action
in the matter was taken in the 1942 session.
Various reasons were assigned by those who opposed payment
of the Sulphur Company claim, but there is little evidence of the
validity of any of these. The real reason for the opposition to
its payment was the strained financial condition of the state,
and the very natural reluctance of its officers to approve the
adoption of legislation authorizing suit, and making provision
for payment of any judgment therein out of surplus which might,
and probably would, be badly needed for other purposes.
23. This suit was discontinued as to the state only, which immediately filed
a new suit alone. See Brief of Plaintiff and Appellee, p. 4, Jefferson Lake Sulphur
Co. v. State, No. 38,490 of the docket of the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
24. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. Tugwell, No. 14,118 of the docket of the
Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge.
25. La. Acts 1940, No. 341.
26. Original Brief of Defendant and Appellant, p. 6, Jefferson Lake Sulphur
Co. v. State, No. 38,490 of the docket of the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
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The Sulphur Company girded itself for legislative battle in
1944. It was an open secret that the new state administration
was as opposed to legislative authorization for suit as the preceding one. Passage of any legislative authorization in 1944 for
suit against the state seemed highly doubtful.
At the opening of the legislative session in 1944, the Sulphur
Company adroitly shifted its strategy. The bill to authorize its:
suit, instead of making provision for payment of any judgment
therein out of a definite fund or out of surplus, merely provided
for what was, in effect, a declaratory judgment.2 7 Under this
bill, after obtaining judgment the Sulphur Company would still
have to come back for an appropriation for its payment, and
the legislature and the Governor could decide then whether the
state's financial condition justified the appropriation. This move
should have dissipated all resistance to the bill, but it did not. The
bill narrowly escaped defeat twice. After being reported favorably by the Senate committee, an opposing senator suddenly had
it recommitted to the committe for further consideration 28 - a
move which normally would have caused sufficient delay to prevent its adoption. Through unusually swift action by the Sulphur Company, it was immediately reported favorably by the
committee again, and in due course passed the Senate. When the
bill came up for final passage in the House, it received a majority of the votes cast, but not of the members elected to the
House.2 9 It was saved by a timely motion to reconsider; and
when it came up again barely received the votes necessary for
its adoption.30 When it was presented to the Governor for signature, however, it was vetoed, and never passed again over the
veto.8 ' Since theretofore it had always been thought that permission to sue the state could only be granted by legislation,the state
administration felt that it had won its fight.
"The best laid schemes o' mice an' men gang aft a-gley" particularly when there is an Annie Lewis available to help them
gang a-gley. On January 15, 1945, the Supreme Court decided
the second Lewis case, holding, inter alia, that suits against the
state might be authorized, and provision made for the payment
of judgments therein, by legislative resolution which was not
27. Senate Bill No. 281 of 1944; Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. State, 213 La.

1, 34 So.2d 331 (1947); LA. SENATE J. 215 (1944).
28. See LA. SENATE-J. 841 (1944).

29. See LA. HousE J. 1907 (1944).
30. See id. at 1908, 1909.
31. See Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. State, 213 La. 1, 34 So.2d 331 (1947).
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subject to veto by the Governor. The fact that the full implications of this decison were not seen immediately is evidenced by
32
the failure of the state to even apply for a rehearing.
The impact was felt when the Sulphur Company filed its suit
against the state some few months thereafter. The sole defense
of the state was that there was no valid authorization for the
suit, and this was raised by the state's exceptions. These were
overruled on July 30, 1945, by one of the ablest trial judges in
Louisiana- the late Charles A. Holcombe. His opinion 33 indicates clearly that but for the Supreme Court's decision in the
second Lewis case he would have sustained the state's exceptions; but that, as the judge of a lower court, he was compelled
to follow that decision and overrule the exceptions.3 4 (The trial
court's final judgment in favor of the Sulphur Company was
affirmed by a divided court a year and a half later ;35 and this
judgment was finally paid some seven years thereafter by a legislative appropriation.) 86
The second Lewis decision staggered the state administration
with twin blows. First, it caused the loss of the Sulphur Company case. Secondly, it made it impossible under the then constitutional provision for a Governor to control the financial
irresponsibility of a legislature which would authorize suits
against the state and make provision for the payment of judgments therein, regardless of the condition of the public exchequer. The latter made an amendment of Article III, § 35, of the
Constitution imperatively necessary.
The 1946 Constitutional Amendment
Prior to amendment, Article III, § 35, of the Constitution provided simply that:
"Whenever the legislature shall authorize suit to be filed
against the State, it shall provide a method of procedure and
the effect of the judgments which may be rendered therein."
As seen heretofore, this provision had proven unsatisfactory
and unworkable, as indicated in the two Lewis cases, and amendment thereof was imperative so as to:
32. See Lewis v. State, 207 La. 194, 20 So.2d 917 (1945).
33. This opinion is quoted in full in Brief of Plaintiff and Appellee, p. 119,
Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. State, No. 38,490 of the docket of the Supreme Court
of Louisiana.
34. See the opinion of the trial judge cited 8upra note 33.
35. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. State, 213 La. 1, 34 So.2d 331 (1947).
36. La. Acts 1954, No. 363.
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(1) Require an adequate and uniform procedure for these
authorized suits; and
(2) Require that all judgments rendered in these authorized
suits be paid only by subsequent legislative appropriations, subject to all of the normal constitutional controls, including the
veto power of the Governor.
This constitutional section was completely rewritten, by the
amendment adopted on November 5, 1946, so as to provide that:
"Whenever the Legislature shall authorize suit to be filed
against the State it shall provide the method for citing the
State therein and shall designate the court or courts in which
the suit or suits authorized may be instituted and may waive
any prescription which may have accrued in favor of the
State against the claim or claims on which suit is so authorized. The procedure in such suits, except as regards
citation and original jurisdiction, shall be the same as in suits
between private litigants, but no judgment for money rendered against the State shall be satisfied except out of monies
appropriated by the Legislature for the purpose. For the
purpose of such suits the State shall be considered as being
domiciled in the Capitol. No such suit shall be instituted in
any court other than a Court of Louisiana. Except as otherwise specially provided in this section, the effect of any authorization by the Legislature for a suit against the State
shall be nothing more than a waiver of the State's immunity
from suit insofar as the suit so authorized is concerned."
Adequacy and uniformity of procedure in these suits was
obtained through the provision that the procedure should be the
same as in suits between private litigants, except with respect to
citation and original jurisdiction, which the authorization had to
spell out.
The second objective was obtained through elimination of
the prior mandate to provide the effect of subsequent judgments,
and the substitution of the requirement that "no judgment for
money rendered against the State shall be satisfied except out
of monies appropriated by the Legislature for the purpose." In
an abundance of caution, and to absolutely prohibit the legislature from making provision for the payment of the judgment in
the authorizing resolution, the final sentence was added:
"Except as otherwise specially provided in this section,
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the effect of any authorization by the Legislature for a suit
against the State shall be nothing more than a waiver of the
State's immunity from suit insofar as the suit so authorized
is concerned."
The only phrase of the original provision retained in the
amended section is the language "Whenever the Legislature shall
authorize suit to be filed against the State." When language of
a former constitutional provision has been construed judicially,
and is retained in the amended provision, there is a strong presumption of an intent to retain this judicial construction. 37 This
retained language had been construed in the second Lewis case,
decided just a year and a half before, to mean that when the
legislature authorized a tort action to be filed against the state
it necessarily waived the state's immunity from liability for the
wrongful act of its employee. This is not only a normal, sensible,
and logical construction of the constitutional language, but horse
sense would preclude any other interpretation of the amended
provision since: (1) 42 of the 50 suits authorized during the
period 1921-1944 were tort actions ;38 (2) 211 of the 229 suits
authorized since were actions ex delicto;3 9 and (3) 46 of the 56
judgments paid by the legislature since 1946 were on tort
40
claims.
There is nothing in the legislative history of this constitutional amendment which indicates any contrary intent. The proposed joint resolution to amend Article III, § 35, was introduced
as Senate Bill No. 103 of 1946. Immediately after introduction,
on motion of one of its sponsors, the bill was amended on the
floor of the Senate to add: (1) the words "and shall designate
the court or courts in which the suit or suits authorized may be
instituted" to the first sentence; and (2) the words "and original
41
jurisdiction" after the word "citation" in the second sentence.
Thereafter it was referred to a committee, reported favorably by
the latter, and passed by the Senate.
When the proposed joint resolution reached the House, it was
referred to Judiciary Committee "A". In due course, the latter
37. Kuhn v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 174 La. 990, 142 So. 149 (1932);
State v. Glenn, 153 La. 147, 95 So. 534 (1923) ; Lehman v. Lehman, 130 La. 960,
58 So. 829 (1912) ; State v. Board of Assessors, 35 La. Ann. 651 (1883). See, to
the same effect, State v. Schneller, 199 La. 811, 7 So.2d 66 (1942).
38. See Table 1, infra p. 481.
39. See Table 2, infra p. 482.
40. These tort judgments aggregated $465,063.37. See Table 3, infra p. 483.
41. See LA. SENATE J. 385 (1940).
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recommended a further amendment so as to add the words "and
may waive any prescription which may have accrued in favor
of the State against the claim or claims on which suit is so
authorized" to the first sentence, and otherwise reported the
resolution favorably. The committee amendment was adopted,
42
and as amended the bill was passed by the House.
There was one additional change which must have been
made by that omnipotent body - the legislative enrolling room.
Throughout its progress through both the Senate and the House
the word "specially" in the last sentence had read "specifically, ' 43
and there is no record of any amendment of the bill in this
respect. The word was changed to "specially" in the proposed
constitutional amendment submitted to the people. 44 This, however, is of no moment.45
II. THE DUREE AND STEPHENS CASES

The Duree Case
The plaintiff here sued to recover damages for the wrongful
death of her husband, killed as the result of the negligence of an
ambulance driver of the State Department of Institutions in
running a red light. The suit was originally brought against
other defendants not pertinent here, but when legislative authorization was later obtained, the state was joined as a defendant. The trial court rendered judgment for a large amount in
favor of plaintiff, and against the state and its liability insurer
(under a policy of limited coverage). The state alone appealed
from this judgment, and the intermediate appellate court af46
firmed.
The legislative authorization for this suit 47 contained a provi-

sion which was substantially identical with the corresponding
section of many other legislative authorizations adopted since
1946. Its Section 6 provided:
"That nothing in this act shall be construed as conferring
on [Mrs. Duree] any different or greater claim or cause of
42. See LA. HOUSE J. 1585, 1783 (1946).
43. See LA. SENATE J. 133, 258, 304, 344, 367, 385 (1946); LA. HOUSE J.
632, 1585, 1783, 1853 (1946).
44. See La. Acts 1946, No. 385.
45. These two words, in the sense employed here, are synonymous. Further,
the proposal submitted to and adopted by the people used the word "specially."
46. Duree v. State, 96 So.2d 854 (La. App. 1957).
47. House Bill No. 387 of 1956.
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may have had before the passage of this

act; the purpose of this act being merely to waive the State's
immunity from suit insofar as the suit herein authorized is
concerned."
(This provision will be referred to a number of times hereinafter
simply as the "restrictive section.")
Based upon this section, the state argued that the plaintiff
could not have sued the state in tort prior to the legislative authorization, and that the legislature had not waived its immunity
from liability for the negligence of its employee in the authorization. The plaintiff answered by invoking the rule of the second
Lewis case: that when the legislature authorizes a suit in tort
against the state, it necessarily waives its immunity from liability.
In the alternative, the state contended that if the legislative
authorization was construed as waiving the state's immunity
from liability, it was unconstitutional. This contention was based
on the argument that the purpose of the 1946 constitutional
amendment was to overrule Crain v. State,48 so as to preclude
the legislature from authorizing a suit on a cause of action
which was not available to the claimant prior to the authorization. The plaintiff admitted that the purpose of this constitutional amendment was to overrule the Crain case, but sought to
differentiate the latter (where the claimant's only prior remedy
was under the Workmen's Compensation Act) from a case where
a plaintiff had a prior cause of action in tort, and the legislative
authorization waived the immunities from suit and from liability.
Relying upon an earlier case in which it had accepted the similar
arguments of the plaintiff, 49 the intermediate appellate court
affirmed.
Under a writ of review, the Supreme Court reversed, and
held that under Article III, § 35, of the Constitution, as amended
in 1946, the legislature could not constitutionally waive the
state's immunity from liability for the negligence of an employee. 50 In support of the position that there is a difference
between the state's immunity from suit and its immunity from
48. 23 So.2d 336 (La. App. 1945).
49. St. Julian v. State, 82 So.2d 85 (La. App. 1955). See, to the same effect,
Marler v. State, 78 So.2d 26 (La. App. 1955). Writs of certiorari were refused
by the Supreme Court in 'both cases. See also Webb v. State, 91 So.2d 156 (La.
App. 1957).
50. Duree v. Maryland Casualty Company, 238 La. 166, 114 So.2d 594 (1959).
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liability for the negligence of an employee, the Supreme Court
quoted a lengthy excerpt from the second Lewis case which included the holding that when the legislature authorized a tort
action it necessarily waived the state's immunity from liability.
The court then went on to hold that there was no waiver of immunity from liability under the legislative authorization, and
further that if such waiver was intended, it would have been
unconstitutional, saying:
"Furthermore, Section 1 [of the legislative authorization
which specifically authorized the action to recover damages
for the death resulting from the negligence of the ambulance
driver], when considered alone, seemingly furnished to plaintiff a remedy that otherwise she did not have. But Section 6
of the enactment [the restrictive section] must also be taken
into consideration; and when that is done it is clear that the
legislation did not create in her favor a cause of action....
"We might observe that House Bill No. 387 of the 1956
Legislature (particularly Section 6 thereof) was obviously
passed in conformity with an amendment adopted in 1946 to
Section 35, Article 3, of the Louisiana Constitution, and for
us to interpret such legislation as plaintiff asks us to do
would render it unconstitutional. The mentioned constitutional amendment, the submission and adoption of which were
apparently influenced by the decisions in Lewis v. State,
supra, and Crain v. State, 23 So.2d 336 (both rendered in
1945), reads as follows: [Here the constitutional provision is
quoted in full, with the court's emphasis by italics on its last
sentence.] "51
The Supreme Court's reference to the second Lewis case, in
the excerpt above, requires explanation as that case had two
important holdings. The second of these was that under Article
III, § 35 (prior to the 1946 amendment) the legislature might
provide for the future payment of any judgment which might be
rendered in any suit which it authorized, and the Governor had
no power to veto the measure. As has been pointed out herein,
and as the Supreme Court itself recognized in the second Cobb
case, 52 this was the primary reason for the 1946 constitutional
amendment. But in the Duree case, the Supreme Court was not
51. 114 So.2d at 597-598.
52. Cobb v. Louisiana Board of Institutions, 237 La. 315, 111 So.2d 126

(1958).
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referring to this holding. Its reference was to the first holding
of this Lewis case - that when the legislature authorized a tort
suit against the state it necessarily waived the latter's immunity
from liability for the negligence of an employee. This is a novel
contention; but if the court's assumption that one of the purposes of the 1946 constitutional amendment was to overturn the
Craincase is correct, this would seem to follow. The reason why
the assumption was accepted was that it was pressed upon the
court by both litigants, who had divergent views of the effect
thereof.
If this assumption is justified, then the validity of the Supreme Court's syllogism in the Duree case is difficult to refute.
If a purpose of the constitutional amendment was to preclude
the legislature from authorizing suit in a. case where the claimant had no right or cause of action before the authorization, it
would preclude valid authorization in both the Crain and the
Duree situations. Under this reasoning, there is little distinction
or difference between a case where the missing element of the
cause of action is due to a statutory rule, and one where it results from a jurisprudential doctrine.
It is interesting to note the effect of the Crain assumption on
the construction of the amended constitutional provision. It is
impossible to give effect to any constitutional intent to overrule
the Crain case without a very strict construction of the first
sentence of the constitutional provision, so as to reach the conclusion that when the legislature authorizes a suit to recover
damages resulting from the negligence of an employee it does
not necessarily waive the state's immunity from such liability.
Then, since no subsequent language of the amended constitutional provision spells out authority for a waiver of immunity
from liability, under the last sentence thereof any legislative
authorization for suit can be only a waiver of immunity from
suit.
In the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the Duree case, it
is obvious that the Crain assumption is buttressed by the restrictive section of the legislative authorization for suit. This is a sort
of thought transference, whereby language from the legislative
authorization is lifted therefrom and inserted into the language
of the constitutional provision. This is permissible only if the
legislative authorization is a contemporaneous legislative construction of the constitutional provision. Both the validity of the
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Crain assumption, and the matter of contemporaneous legislative
construction will be inquired into later.
The Stephens Case
Here, the plaintiff sued the defendant school board to recover
damages for the wrongful death of her husband, which resulted
from the negligence of the defendant's employee, the driver of a
school bus. 53 For present purposes, this case can be regarded
simply as a reaffirmation by the Supreme Court of the Duree
decision, and an extension of the latter's holding to state subdivisions. 54 The arguments pro and con were much the same,
except that the plaintiff in the Stephens case did insist that the
1946 constitutional amendment was not intended to overrule the
first point decided in the second Lewis case (as held by the
Supreme Court in Duree), but rather the second. However, the
plaintiff again admitted that one of the purposes of this amendment was to overrule the Crain case, and again was trapped by
the logical extension of that assumption. The Stephens case
stands or falls on the validity of the Duree decision, and both are
bottomed on the Crain assumption.
III.

THE GRAIN MYTH

Conception, Gestation, and Birth
It strains one's credulity to the breaking point to accept the
view that all of the ponderous governmental machinery for the
amendment of the organic law of the state was set in motion
because some unfortunate highway employee was hit in the head
by a shovel carelessly wielded by a co-worker, and wanted damages instead of workmen's compensation. The fellow-servant
rule afforded the state a complete defense to such an action
ex delicto, unless the legislature saw fit to waive this defense;
and the legislature had complete control over the granting or
withholding of authorization for such a suit. Here, the unfortunate Mr. Crain appears to be playing out of his league.
Had the constitutional intent been to overrule the Crain case,
53. The decision of the trial court, sustaining the defendant's exceptions, was
reversed by the intermediate appellate court. Stephens v. Natchitoches Parish
School Board, 96 So.2d 396 (La. App. 1957). After a remand, the trial court
rendered judgment for the plaintiff, which was increased by the intermediate appellate court, and otherwise affirmed. Id., 110 So.2d 156 (La. App. 1959).
54. See Stephens v. Natchitoches Parish School Board, 238 La. 388, 115 So.2d
793 (1959).
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why did the language of the constitutional amendment so completely conceal that fact? How simple it would have been to add
a proviso at the end of the first sentence of the amended constitutional provision reading: "but the Legislature may not
waive the State's immunity from liability for the wrongful acts
of its employees." Or, this proviso could have used the language
of the restrictive sections of some of these legislative authorizations for suit and could have read: "but the Legislature may not
grant any claimant a different or greater cause of action or claim
than he had before the suit was authorized." Where and how did
the Crain assumption originate? It can be traced back to a
rumor current during the last few years that: (1) the bill proposing the 1946 constitutional amendment was drafted by a
prominent member of the legal staff of a state department; and
(2) the language of the bill which he drafted clearly reflected
the purpose of overruling the Crain case, but this language was
changed by legislative amendment prior to final passage. The
second portion of this rumor is clearly refuted by the legislative
history of this constitutional amendment. No convincing evidence was found which either confirms or refutes the first portion thereof. A hypothesis which appears to be more logical than
his draftsmanship of the bill is that he was the draftsman of
the restrictive section of at least the first of the bills to obtain
legislative authorization for suit in 1946, and that he wrote
therein his own interpretation of the proposed constitutional
amendment. But assuming that he was the draftsman, and now
says he had intended to overrule the Crain case, so what? It is
not this expression of his intent which is determinative here,
but the intent of the legislature which proposed the amendment
55
and of the people who adopted it.
The judicial fountainhead of the Crain assumption is the
opinion of the able trial judge in McKnight v. State. 56 There, the
55. "My Lords, I have more than once had occasion to say that in construing a statute I believe the worst person to construe it is the person who is
responsible for its drafting. He is very much disposed to confuse what he intended to do with the effect of the language which in fact has been employed. At
the time he drafted the statute, at all events, he may have been under the impression that he had given full effect to what was intended, but he may be mistaken
in construing it afterwards just because what was in his mind was what was
intended, though, perhaps, it was not done." The Lord Chancellor, the Earl of
Halsbury, in Hilder v. Dexter [1902] A.C. 474, 477. See, to the same effect,
Third District Land Co. v. Toka, 170 So. 793, 795 (La. App. 1936) ; 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNsTRucTIoN 499, 504, 505 (Horack's 3d ed., 1943). See
also Elliott, Statute Construction and the Court of Military Appeals, 30 TUL. L.
REV. 1, 9 (1955).
56. See McKnight v. State, 68 So.2d 652 (La. App. 1953).
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state had pleaded a prior judgment in favor of the state's employee as res judicata of the subsequent action brought against
the state to recover damages for the alleged wrongful act of that
employee, and had presented much the same argument which it
was to present later in all subsequent cases. The legislative authorization for the suit in the McKnight case had a restrictive
section and this appeared to the trial judge to corroborate the
validity of the Crain assumption invoked by the state. In rendering judgment for the latter, the learned trial judge said in his
opinion:
"It is highly probable that the impact of Judge Dore's
dissenting opinion [in the Crain case] was responsible for
the amendment of the constitutional section in question, the
decision being handed down just a few months prior to the
1946 session of the Legislature. Prior to the amendment of
the section, any contrary opinion in the mind of this Court
must, of course, have yielded to the majority opinion of the
higher court in the Crain case. Now, happily, the plain language of the amended section places in the Constitution the
provision that Judge Dore strove to place in the jurisprudence
'57
by interpretation.
The snowball immediately commenced to roll. This opinion of
the trial judge was approved and adopted by the intermediate
appellate court in McKnight v. State ;58 and the Crain assumption
was judicially accepted by the same court in the Gilmore59 and
St. Julian0 cases. While not expressly reiterated, it was certainly
implied in this court's opinion in the Duree case.6 1 It had now
been repeated so often that it had won universal acceptance;
judicial recognition had provided "confirmations strong as
proofs of holy writ."
Contemporary Explanations of Purposes of Amendment
Since this constitutional amendment was adopted in 1946,
before the creation of the Legislative Council,62 and prior to the
time the Public Affairs Research Council commenced its studies
on these matters, a resort must be had to less official contemporary explanations of the purpose thereof.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See id. at 654.
68 So.2d 652 (La. App. 1953).
Gilmore v. State, 79 So.2d 192, 196 (La. App. 1955).
St. Julian v. State, 82 So.2d 85, 87 (La. App. 1955).
Duree v. State, 96 So.2d 854, 862 (La. App. 1957).
By La. Acts 1952, No. 51.
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Probably the most accurate analyses and expositions of the
purposes and effect of new legislation for years have been those
written after each legislative session by Mr. Carlos E. Lazarus,
Coordinator of Research of the Louisiana State Law Institute.
Somewhat detailed explanations of the purposes of the proposed
amendment of Article III, § 35, of the Constitution were written
by him even before the adoption of this amendment on November
5, 1946.6 There, he traces the history of the constitutional authorization for suits against the state, points out the defects of
the constitutional provision then in effect, and voices the opinion
that the purpose of this proposed amendment was to overrule the
Lewis cases. He does not even cite the Crain case, nor does he
mention any constitutional intent to preclude state employees
from obtaining authority to sue the state in tort, nor any purpose
of precluding the legislature from waiving the state's immunity
from liability for the wrongful acts of its employees.'
Let us see what explanations of the purposes of this proposed
amendment were given to the people of Louisiana by its larger
newspapers. The paper having the largest circulation in the
state is, of course, the New Orleans Times-Picayune. An editorial
published less than a week before the proposals to amend the
Constitution were to be voted on, and entitled "Some Good, Some
Bad Court Amendments," includes the following:
"Present provisions of the constitution have made for
confusion and delays in suits against the state when they are
authorized by the Legislature. Amendment No. 18,64 which
should be ratified, would clarify the procedure. Safeguards
are retained in that suits could be brought only with legislative consent and money could be paid out only from an appropriation made in each case."0 15
This same newspaper also published the recommendations for
ratification of the proposed amendment by the New Orleans
Association of Commerce, 6 and the Young Men's Business Club
of New Orleans ;67 both of these organizations recommended an
63. Lazarus, Louisiana Legislation of 1946, 7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 23,
51, 52, 109-112 (1946).
64. The official ballot used on November 5, 1946, to vote on the various constitutional amendments proposed lists the one to amend Article III, § 35, as No. 18
thereon.
65. New Orleans Times-Picayune 10 (October 30, 1946).
66. "The Board of the Association of Commerce Tuesday approved 12 of the 31
constitutional amendments to be voted upon in the November 5 general election:
. No. 18, authorizing Leigslature to set procedure for suits against the
state ..
" New Orleans Times-Picayune 17 (October 23, 1946).
67. "Proposed amendments approved by the [Young Men's Business Club]
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affirmative vote for this amendment, and stated its purpose as
being a clarification of the procedure in suits against the state.
This analysis is completely accurate, for the purpose of the
amendment was to provide adequate and uniform procedure for
the suits so authorized, and to change the procedure for the payment of judgments rendered therein.
The Baton Rouge State-Times ran a number of editorials and
articles on this proposed amendment, recommending its adoption. All of these referred to the proposed amendment as necessary to clarify the procedure in suits against the state.6 One of
these editorials, in the light of the developments on the subject
during the past year, is somewhat amusing: "18. Provide that
the legislature shall adopt procedure for suits filed against the
state. Vote 'Yes'. Reasons: This will only save some confusion."6 9
(Emphasis added.) What a poor prophet the State-Times has
turned out to be!
In its editorial of November 3, 1946, recommending adoption
or rejection of the various constitutional amendments proposed,
the Shreveport Times appeared to be in doubt with respect to
the proposal to amend Article III, § 35, for in this connection it
states: "Number Eighteen - The lawyers should know, we asked
them and they did not reply." 70 Apparently, this prodding seems
to have had an immediate effect, for in an article in this newspaper entitled "Purposes of Amendments Summarized for
Voters," it states the purpose of Amendment No. 18 to be the
clarification of procedure in suits against the state.7 1
Not a single one of these newspapers contains the slightest
hint that the purpose of this proposed constitutional amendment
was to change the substantive law of Louisiana, so as to preclude
follows: ... No. 18, establishment of a procedure in suits against the state; ....
New Orleans Times-Picayune 11 (October 31, 1946).
See also Editorial, "Thirty-one Amendments: A Digest": "... No. 18 -FORClarifies procedure in suits against the state." New Orleans Times-Picayune 14
(November 3, 1946).
68. In an article entitled "31 Constitutional Amendments to Be Voted on by
Louisiananians on Nov. 5," the following was said with reference to Amendment
No. 18: "Provide that when the legislature authorizes suits against the state it
shall designate in which courts they may 'be instituted and waive prescription;
provide other procedural details for such suits." Baton Rouge State-Times 11A
(October 28, 1946).
On the day before the election the following was said to be the purpose of
Amendment No. 18: "Clarify procedure in suits against the state." Id. at 1A, 6A
(November 4, 1946).
69. Id. at 4A (November 4, 1946).
70. Shreveport Times 18 (November 3, 1946).
71. Id. at 19 (November 3, 1946).
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authorization for suits in tort by state employees, or legislative
waiver of the state's immunity from liability for the wrongful
acts of its employees. If either of these had been a purpose of
this amendment, then elaborate and unusual precautions must
have been taken by the persons responsible to prevent discovery
of the true facts by alert reporters covering the legislative session.
Let us see whether the members of the legislature were let in
on these esoteric secrets.
Contemporaneous Legislative Construction
The strongest - in fact, the only - evidence which was
found to support the Crain assumption was the restrictive sections in the legislative authorizations for suit against the state,
its agencies, and subdivisions. These restrictive sections made
their first appearance in 1946, the year in which the proposal to
amend Article III, § 35, was adopted, and continued through
1959. There is little doubt but that the draftsman of the first
of these inserted them with the intent to overrule the Craincase,
and probably because he thought this was the purpose of the
constitutional amendment itself. However, this fact does not
compel the further admission that this was the intention of the
draftsmen of all of the legislative authorizations which contain
a restrictive section, for the traditional slavery of attorneys to
forms must be taken into account here. After all, the language
of these restrictive sections is appealingly neat and attractive.
Lawyers like neatly-turned phrases, particularly those sprinkled
with hackneyed modifiers such as "said" and "aforesaid," which
seldom serve any useful purpose, but which are relished as much
as caraway seeds on rye bread, and probably for the same reason.
But it must be admitted that a person or persons presently unknown - possibly an attorney or attorneys employed by a state
department - thought that one of the purposes of the 1946 constitutional amendment was to overrule the Crain decision, and
plastered these restrictive sections on all of the legislative authorizations for suit which he or they were requested to draft.
What does this prove? The intent of the draftsman, whether of
the bill proposing the constitutional amendment or of these restrictive sections, surely does not bind the legislature, the people,
or the courts.7 2 That fictive but very necessary concept, the con72. See note 55 8upra.
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stitutional intent, can be gleaned only from the language of the
constitutional amendment itself, construed in the light of its history if there is any ambiguity therein.
So this evidence is valueless, unless there was a consistent,
continuous legislative practice of using these restrictive sections
in legislative authorizations for suit, which would constitute a
contemporaneous legislative construction of the amendment supporting the Crain assumption. So many of these legislative authorizations adopted since 1946 do contain these restrictive sections that this creates the initial impression that they are contained in all- which would provide the answer for which the
researcher was looking. A careful analysis of all of these legislative authorizations, however, pricks this bubble immediately.
The following tabulation, 73 showing the number of legislative
authorizations which contain such a restrictive section, and the
number of those which do not, will serve our present purposes:
Legislative

Number with Re-

Number without Re-

Authorizations

strictive Sections

strictive Sections

1946
1948
1950
1952
1954
1956
1957
1957
1958
1958
1959
1959

Acts
Acts
Acts
Acts
Acts
Acts
Acts
Resolutions
Acts
Resolutions
Acts
Resolutions

14
8
7
17
16
5
6
7
43
3
8
2

6
11
4
13
20
7
1
2
14
3
6
6

136

93

So while these 136 legislative authorizations which contain a
restrictive section constitute a majority, the 93 which do not
clearly negative any continuous, consistent practice indicating
any contemporaneous legislative construction supporting the
Crain assumption.
The analysis required to obtain the information listed above,
however, produced some very interesting by-products. Since the
73. These legislative authorizations are listed and classified in Table 2, infra
p. 482.
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claimant need not disclose the fact that he is a state employee
when he seeks legislative authorization to sue for damage, it is
impossible to determine how many of these authorizations cover
the same factual situation as the Crain case - where a state employee, not disclosed as such and entitled to workmen's compensation, obtains legislation permitting him to sue for damages.
But a number of these legislative authorizations were found
where the claimant, disclosed as an employee of the state, or of
an agency or subdivision thereof, was authorized to sue for damages for physical injuries alleged to have resulted from the negligence of another employee of the state, or of the same agency
or subdivision thereof. Two such cases are to be found in the
1946 acts, passed the same year as the resolution proposing the
constitutional amendment.7 4 Two more legislative authorizations
for suit under facts identical in this respect with the Crain case
were adopted in 1948, 75 only a year and a half after the constitutional amendment. Two more such legislative authorizations
were adopted in 1950 ;76 two more in 1952 ;77 one additional in
1954 ;78 one more in 1957 ;79 at least one additional in 1958 ;s0 and
one more in 1959.81

Incongruously enough, at least two of these legislative authorizations for tort actions in situations like the Crain case contain
a restrictive section. 82 But here is the choice morsel: who do you
think came back to the legislature to obtain further legislative
authority? You've guessed it: Mr. W. Edmond Crain - the Mr.
Crain. He wanted his original legislative authorization amended
and re-enacted, and though he sought confirmation of his authorization to sue for damages, this time he disclosed the fact that
he was an employee of the Highway Department at the time of
his injury. He also sought waiver of the ten-year prescription
provided in R.S. 49:112, and authority for the Highway Depart74. La. Acts 1946, Nos. 40 and 244.
75. La. Acts 1948, Nos. 162 and 417. The second of these is ambiguous in
authorizing suit "for damages and workmen's compensation." Section 1.
76. La. Acts 1950, Nos. 465 and 507.
77. La. Acts 1952, Nos. 164 and 219.
78. La. Acts 1954, No. 559.
79. House Concurrent Resolution No. 43 of 1957. See LA. SENATE J. 154, 155
(1957).
80. La. Acts 1958, No. 203. La. Acts 1958, Nos. 59 and 60 appear to cover the
Crain situation, but are not included above because the language leaves it somewhat doubtful.
81. House Concurrent Resolution No. 33 of 1959. See LA. SENATE J. 169, 170
(1959).
82. House Concurrent Resolution No. 43 of 1957; La. Acts 1958, No. 203. See
also La. Acts 1958, Nos. 59 and 60.
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ment to compromise his suit. The legislature granted all of his
requests.8
Do these matters evidence a contemporaneous legislative construction supporting the Crain assumption? There are, however,
two other contemporaneous constructions of the constitutional
84
provision evidenced by these legislative authorizations for suit
adopted during the period 1946 through 1959:
(1) The overruling of the Crain case was not a purpose of
the constitutional amendment, evidenced by at least a round
dozen of these Crain-type legislative authorizations; and
(2) Precluding the legislature from waiving the state's immunity from liability for the wrongful acts of its employees was
not a purpose of the constitutional amendment, evidenced by 211
of these legislative authorizations.
Conclusions
At times the "hunch" may play a perfectly legitimate role in
the judicial process. It does when the intuitive judgment of the
experienced judge flashes spontaneously to end the travail and
ordeal which always result from the weighing of clashing legal
5
It should never be pertheories which compete for acceptance.A
mitted to play any part in the decision of facts, whether based on
evidence as to who reached the intersection first in automobile
collision cases, or on judicial notice of the annals of contemporary
history.
Viewed from any angle, there is no evidence of probative
value to support the assumption that one of the purposes of the
1946 constitutional amendment was to overrule the Crain decision. Whether the inquiry is made through the textual construction of the constitutional provision, its legislative history,
contemporary legal history, newspaper explanations made during the period in question, or the contemporaneous legislative
construction consistently and continuously, it leads to the same
conclusion. The purposes of this constitutional amendment were:
(1) to require an adequate and uniform procedure for suits
83. La. Acts 1950, No. 465, amending and re-enacting La. Acts 1944, No. 341.
84. See Table 2, infra p. 482.
85. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in
Judicial Decision, 14 CORN. L. Q. 274 (1929). Perhaps, in a parody of Judge
Hutcheson's famous article, this paper should be entitled "The Judgment Assumptive: The Effect of a Hunch on Judicial Decisions."
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authorized; and (2) to require that judgments therein be paid
through legislative appropriations subject to constitutional controls, including the veto power of the Governor.
In view of all of these facts, the Crain assumption seems as
fantastic as the lengthy and learned dissertations of the members
of the Pickwick Club in an effort to decipher the mystic runic
inscription on the flat stone on which, some years before, a nearly illiterate yokel had attempted to carve his name.8
IV.

THE RESTRICTIVE SECTIONS

All that remains to be done is to interpret the legislative authorization for the Duree suit,8 7 to determine the effect of the
restrictive section therein.
The theoretical doubt as to whether recovery is permitted
under this legislative authorization, assuming that the legislature may constitutionally authorize a suit to recover damages for
wrongful death resulting from the negligence of a state employee,
stems from the fact that the legislature is never required to exercise all of its constitutional power, where the latter is discretionary. Even though it had plenary power to authorize such a suit,
conceivably it might have played a cruel hoax on poor Mrs. Duree
by waiving immunity from suit but withholding waiver of immunity from liability for the negligence of the state employee.
With the Crain myth out of our way, an application of elementary principles of statutory construction leaves the members
of the legislature as pure and as white as an Easter lily. Two
separate arguments reach the same result. Firstly, if the first
section of the legislative authorization permits suit against the
state to recover damages for wrongful death resulting from the
negligence of a state employee, under the second Lewis case this
necessarily includes waiver of immunity from such liability.
Then, to give effect to the legislative authorization as a whole,
and not render it nugatory, the restrictive section must be construed liberally to avoid any contradiction of or conflict with the
first section. As so construed, the restrictive section means only
that the legislature has not authorized recovery on any claim or
cause of action except the one specifically described in the first
section.
86. Cf. DICKENS, PICKWICK PAPERS, C. XI.
87. The legislative authorization for the Stephen8 suit contained no restrictive section. See House Concurrent Resolution No. 45 of 1959, LA. SENATE J. 542,
543 (1959).
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Secondly, the legislature definitely considered that the action which it authorized in the first section was on a pre-existing
cause of action which Mrs. Duree had before the passage of the
legislative authorization. This is proven conclusively by another
section therein which waives accrued prescription. There can be
no accrued prescription on a cause of action which is just being
created. The only way the section waiving accrued prescription
can be given any effect whatever is by construing the first section as authorizing suit on a pre-existing cause of action. As so
construed, the restrictive section means only that the legislature
has not authorized recovery on any claim or cause of action
except the one specifically described in the first section."8
V.

THE AFTERMATH AND THE REMEDY

As a result of these decisions, Mesdames Duree and Stephens
and their children have been deprived of the compensation previously awarded them by the intermediate appellate courts.
Numerous claimants, previously authorized to sue to recover for
physical injuries, property damage, or the loss of a spouse or
parent, resulting from governmental operations, now find that
they are completely without a remedy. The legislature has been
rendered impotent to afford any relief. The practicing lawyers
of the state are greatly disturbed over these decisions, and
though they may not know exactly why, they do feel intuitively
that these decisions are wrong. The House of Delegates of the
Louisiana State Bar Association has adopted a resolution recommending that they be overruled by constitutional amendment;
and the Association's Committee on Law Reform is now working
diligently on the drafts of such an amendment and on implementing legislation. All of this because, back in 1931, the unfortunate Mr. Crain was accidentally hit in the head with a
89
shovel.
Even prior to the Duree and Stephens cases, the enforcement
of claims against the state, its agencies and subdivisions, was
difficult, and the methods available therefor unsatisfactory.
Seven years ago last February, twenty purebred Aberdeen-Angus
cows worth $50,000 died as the result of eating a poisonous
88. This second argument is applicable to all of the legislative authorizations
for tort suits which contain a restrictive section, except the two (or possibly four)
authorizing an action ex delicto by state employees entitled to workmen's compensation, which are cited in note 82 supra.
89. In a moment of irritation generated by long and dull hours of research, the
authors were strongly tempted by the feeling that the most appropriate title for
this article would be "If That Shovel Had Only Missed Poor Mr. Crain."
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ersatz sold as black-strap molasses to their owner by the state
penitentiary sugar refinery. Ever since then the owner has been
shuttled from the trial court to the Supreme Court to the legislature, and over this route again and again. This cycle is now
being completed for the third time,9° and the owner is still an
unknown distance away from restitution.
One look at the legislative authorizations for suit and the special appropriations for the payment of judgments therein listed
in the tables at the end of this article gives some indication of
the extent to which the members of the legislature were forced
to spin their wheels. Imagine the waste of legislative time and
the cost to the state in dollars and cents which the introduction,
consideration, and adoption of these bills and resolutions entailed. Parliamentary procedures are time consuming even for
perfunctory matters. The pecuniary cost of the system is high,
but this is not the only price which is paid; the process diverts
a very considerable amount of legislative attention from more
important matters. What has this cumbersome and antiquated
system accomplished? Apparently, few requests for legislative
permission to sue are refused, 91 and no requests for appropriations for the payment of judgments are denied, if funds therefor
92
are available.
Further, the public policies on which this system is based are
completely unsuited to the twentieth century, and are as outmoded as the wager of battle. Both the state's immunity from
suit and its immunity from liability for the wrongful acts of its
employees rest on political dogmas which have been rejected in
America, and repudiated many years ago in England. The first
rests on the omnipotence of the King, who is above all human
law; while the second is based on the ancient maxim "The King
can do no wrong." In the effort to mitigate the harsh effects of
90. See Cobb v. Louisiana Board of Institutions, 229 La. 1, 85 So.2d 10 (1955),
on rehearing (1956) ; Senate Bill No. 100 of 1956; Cobb v. Louisiana Board of
Institutions, 237 La. 315, 111 So.2d 126 (1958) ; House Concurrent Resolution
No. 5 of 1959, see LA. SENATE J. 79, 80 (1959). A third case, Cobb v. Louisiana
Board of Institutions, is now pending in the Supreme Court on an appeal by the
state from the trial court's third judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
91. No special search was made on this point, but from the authors' examination of the bills and resolutions introduced during the period 1946 through 1959
to authorize suit against the stae, its agencies and subdivisions, it appears that
only two of these requests were not granted. House Concurrent Resolution No. 3
of 1959, authorizing an action ex delicto, was withdrawn without unfavorable
action thereon. See LA. HousE J. 343, 344 (1959). Senate Concurrent Resolution
No. 20 of 1959, authorizing suit to obtain a refund of taxes paid, was never even
referred to a committee. See La. Senate Calendar 36-38 (1959).
92. See Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 41 of 1958.
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these anachronistic immunities, we adopted the nebulous and
shadowy distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary"
functions, for which we have paid a price nearly equal to its
occasional benefits. Government today is big business, whether
at the national, state, or local level, and the risk of injury and
damage from governmental operations has increased enormously
in recent years. The laws which regulate the accountability of
persons (including corporations, partnerships, and unincorporated associations), so far as practicable, should now be applied
93
to define the responsibility of government.
The present ills can be cured only through major surgery.
Firstly, Article III, § 35, of the Constitution should be
amended so as to expressly:
(1) Empower the legislature to adopt general or special
legislation, 94 prospective or retroactive, to authorize the filing of
suits in the state courts against the state and its public bodies,
and to waive the immunities thereof from suit and from liability
for the wrongful act of an employee;
(2) Provide that the procedure in actions so authorized shall
be the same as in suits between private litigants, except that
there shall be no trial by jury, and the legislature may provide a
different venue and mode of citing the defendant;
(3) Provide that the legislature may waive any prescription
which may have accrued in favor of the defendant, as to all
suits filed prior to January 1, 1962; and that the legislature
may further waive the defense of res judicatawhen a prior suit
was dismissed because there had been no waiver of immunity
from liability for the wrongful act of an employee;
(4) Provide that judgments rendered against the state shall
be paid only from funds appropriated for such purposes, and
93. Excellent articles on the subject were published in the Government Tort
Liability Symposium, 29 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1321-1461 (1954). These include an
introduction to the general subject by Dean Stason of the University of Michigan
Law School, and the following articles: Gellhorn & Lauer, Federal Liability for
Personal and Property Damage, id. at 1325; Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability
of the States, id. at 1363; Wade, Liability in Tort of the Central Government of
the United Kingdom, id. at 1416; and Schwartz, Public Tort Liability in France,
id. at 1432.
94. The constitutional amendment suggested above would repeal by implication the sentence of Article XIX, § 26, of the Constitution, as amended on November 6, 1956, requiring individual legislative authorization for each action
ex delicto against a special agency, as defined therein. However, this would not
defeat the purpose of the latter constitutional provision, since the legislature could
limit its general legislation by excepting therefrom suits against these special
agencies prohibited by Article XIX, § 26.
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that the legislature shall provide the manner in which judgments
against local governmental bodies or units shall be paid; and
(5) Provide a broad definition of "public bodies," so as to
include parishes, municipalities, and every public board or body
created by the Constitution and laws of the state.
Future trouble would be invited by a retention of the final
sentence of the present constitutional provision. This was inserted simply to require legislative appropriations to pay judgments rendered against the state, and since this is spelled out
above, its retention is unnecessary.
One of the most difficult decisions to reach is with respect to
the language to be employed in the general waiver of immunities
which any implementing general legislation should contain. A
number of solutions are available. The general legislation might
track the language of the Federal Tort Claims Act; but in view
of the difficulties experienced thereunder,9" this certainly is not
recommended. A second possibility is to subject the state and
public bodies to exactly the same rules of substantive law which
apply to persons. This, however, opens up a bottomless pit, as
the duties owed by governments are so dissimilar to those owed
by persons that liability for breach of every duty by a government is most alarming. Another alternative would be to permit
any and all kinds of suits and actions, with a few broad exceptions. This has most of the same defects as the preceding alternative, with the added difficulty that these exceptions must be
couched in broad and general terms, which may take decades
of litigation to determine their meaning.
A more pragmatic, and less radical, solution of the problem
is to permit the filing of all suits which in the past the legislature
has permitted, or at least intended to permit; and later, as further extensions appear desirable, these may be added by retroactive amendments. This alternative is definitely feasible, as
prior legislative authorizations for suit can be classified into a
relatively few categories. The numerous cases where statutes
and the jurisprudence now permit suits against public bodies
without legislative permission can be covered by an omnibus
section. The expansion of legislation affecting persons, by accretion in the manner suggested above, is completely unworkable,
since the amendment cannot be made to apply retroactively, and
95. See Gellhorn & Lauer, Federal Liability for Personal and Property Damage,
29 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1325 (1954).
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the rights which suggest the need for amendment are invariably
sacrificed. This would not be true with respect to legislation
affecting the state and public bodies, which can be made retroactive. Thus, amendments of the general legislation can be made
from time to time as the desirability thereof becomes evident,
and the amending act can provide that it is to apply retroactively.
The claimant would be prejudiced only through the necessity of
waiting less than a year, until the legislature could authorize his
suit by a retroactive amendment of the general legislation.
General legislation to implement the amended constitutional
provision, to take effect on the effective date of the latter, should
provide expressly:
(1) The immunity from suit of the defendant is waived
with respect to any suit or action brought against the state, or
a public body thereof:
(a) Which could have been brought against the defendant
on July 1, 1960;
(b) To recover just and adequate compensation for property taken or damaged for public purposes;
(c) To enforce a contract, or a quasi-contractual obligation,
or to recover damages for breach of a contract;
(d) To enforce a claim of ownership of property, or a right
to the possession thereof;
(e) To restrain the enforcement, or otherwise declare the
invalidity, of an unconstitutional or invalid statute, ordinance, or
regulation, except as provided in Article XIX, § 26, of the Constitution ;96
(f) To recover a tax, local improvement assessment, license,
or penalty paid in error, or under an unconstitutional or invalid
statute or ordinance; and
(g) To recover money paid to the defendant, which lawfully
belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The immunity from suit, and the immunity from liability
for the wrongful act of its employee, or the state or a public body
thereof is waived with respect to a suit to recover damages for
wrongful death, physical injury, or property damage resulting
96. See Note 94, supra.
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from a negligent or wrongful act of commission or omission of
an employee of the defendant in the following:
(a) The operation of a motorcycle, automobile, bus, truck,
tractor, or other motor vehicle, of an elevator in a public building,
or of machinery or mechanical equipment;
(b) The construction, repair, or maintenance of a highway,
street, or other public road, sidewalk, or of a publicly owned or
operated bridge or ferry;
(c)

Trespass to private property;

(d)

The repair or maintenance of a public building;

(e) The failure to confine, or to guard adequately, an inmate
of a penitentiary, prison, jail, or other correctional institution,
or of a mental institution or hospital; and
(f) The spraying or dusting with insecticides or other chemicals to eradicate weeds, or plant diseases.
These are the most important provisions of the implementing
legislation recommended. The less important sections are sum97
marized below.
Finally, a policy decision must be made as to whether the
death or injury of a governmental employee should be governed
exclusively by the Workmen's Compensation Act, or whether a
97. This statute should have additional sections which provide:
(1) The procedure to be used in these suits;
(2) As to all suits filed prior to January 1, 1962: all accrued prescription in
favor of the defendant is waived, and the defense of res judicata is waived if the
prior suit was dismissed on the ground that there had been no waiver of immunity
from liability for the wrongful act of an employee; and all suits filed thereafter
are to be governed by the prescription applicable generally to the causes of action
therein;
(3) A reasonable limit on the amount which may be recovered for the death
or injury of one person, and another reasonable limit on the total amounts which
may be recovered for the deaths or injuries resulting from a single accident;
(4) When a money judgment against the state becomes executory, a certified
copy thereof shall be mailed by the plaintiff to the State Division of Administration, and the latter shall include an item in the proposed general appropriation
bill to provide for the payment of all such judgments received more than one month
prior to the regular legislative session; and that the next budget of a public body
shall provide for the payment of all executory money judgments rendered against
it prior to the introduction of its budget ordinance;
(5) A canon of liberal construction, to accomplish the purposes of the legislation ;
(6) A broad and comprehensive definition of "public bodies," identical with
that contained in the constitutional amendment;
(7) A severability clause; and
(8) The effective date of the statute, if and when the constitutional amendment is adopted.
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recovery in tort should be permitted. 98 This brings us back to
Mr. Crain again.
TABLE 1
LIST OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR SUIT AGAINST THE
STATE OF LOUISIANA, ITS AGENCIES AND SUBDIVISIONS
DURING THE PERIOD 1921 THROUGH 1944,
BOTH INCLUSIVE
Authorization:

Act No. 184

Type of Claim:
Authorization:
Regular Session of 1928

Title to property

Act No. 330

Type o f Claim:

Title to property

Regular Session of 1930

Act No. 25

Physical injury

Act No. 206

Physical injury

Act No. 88
Act No. 217

Title to property
Physical injury

Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

158
352
353
354
355
356
357
358

Title to property
Physical injury
Wrongful death
Physical injury
Physical injury
Wrongful death
Physical injury
Trespass to property

Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

273
274
275
276
277
278

Physical injury
Physical injury
Wrongful death
Physical injury
Physical injury
Wrongful death

Regular Session of 1934
Regular Session of 1938

Act No. 287
Act No. 336

Physical injury
Physical injury

Regular Session of 1940

Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366

Physical injury
Wrongful death
Physical injury
Property damage
Wrongful death
Trespass to property
Physical injury
Wrongful death

Regular Session of 1942

Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

279
280
335
336
337
354

Wrongful
Physical
Property
Property
Property
Physical

death
injury
damage
damage
damage
injury

Physical
Property
Property
Property
Property
Physical

injury
damage
damage
damage
damage
injury

Extraordinary Session of 1942

Act No. 11

Title to property

Act
Act
Act
Act
Act

Property damage
Money paid in error
Physical injury
Physical injury
Workmen's
compensation
Wrongful death

Regular Session of 1944

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

36
52
61
82
155

Act No. 162

Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Sen.

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
Bill

194
249
333
334
336
341
No. 2811

1. This bill, authorizing the Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. to sue the State to
recover money due, passed both Houses, but was vetoed by the Governor and never
re-passed over this veto. This was held sufficient as a legislative resolution to
authorize the suit. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. State, 213 La. 1, 34 So.2d 331
(1948). This legislative authorization was not included in the Louisiana Acts of
1944.
98. This general legislation should also provide specifically that no action may
be brought for the recovery of damages for the wrongful death or injury of 'an
employee of the state. Otherwise, under a liberal construction of the statute
it may be held that such a cause of action has been created, which will lead to a.
complete breakdown of the present system of covering these employees under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. In such an event, the compensation insurer would
then be able to recoup all compensation payments which it had paid, or would pay,
under its subrogatory rights.
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TABLE 2
LIST OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR SUIT AGAINST THE
STATE OF LOUISIANA, ITS AGENCIES AND SUBDIVISIONS
DURING THE PERIOD 1946 THROUGH 1959,
BOTH INCLUSIVE
(All acts and resolutions below not preceded by an asterisk authorized tort suits
to recover damages for wrongful death, physical injury, or property damage)
Authorization:

Restrictive

Section:

Restrictive

Authorization:

Section:

Regular Session of 1946

Act
*Act
Act
Act
Act
*Act
*Act
Act
Act
Act

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

40
110
188
244
252
298
309
317
320
324

No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

76
106
162
218
220
221
222
226
249
251

No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Act
Act
*Act
Act
Act
Act

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

9
297
322
399
427
465

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

*Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

19
26
27
85
102
146
153
163
164
166
174
175

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No

Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

335
336
337
342
344
353
356
360
365
378

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

317
319
328
332
417
418
421
422
424

No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No

Regular Session of 1948

Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

Regular Session of 1950

Act No. 488
Act No. 507
H. Bill No. 1451
H. Bill No. 9562
Sen. Bill No.1573

Yes
Yes
No
No
No

Regular Session of 1952

Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

179
193
219
224
227
228
234
235
267
349
377
411

1. This bill was passed by both Houses, vetoed by the
passed again over his veto. It was not included in the 1950
See Preuett v. State, 62 So.2d 686 (La. App. 1953).
2. This bill was passed by both Houses, vetoed by the
passed again over his veto. It was not included in the 1950
See Preuett v. State, 62 So.2d 693 (La. App. 1953).
3. This bill was passed by both Houses, vetoed by the
passed again over his veto. It was not included in the 1950
See LA. HOUSE J. 1298 (1950).

No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Governor, and never
Acts for this reason.
Governor, and never
Acts for this reason.
Governor, and never
Acts for this reason.
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TABLE 2 -Continued

Authorization:

Act No. 424
Act No. 456
Act No. 463

Restrictive
Section:

Yes
No
No

Authorization:

Restrictive
Section,:

Act No. 466
Act No. 479
*Act No. 517

No
Yes
No

Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
*Act
Act
Act
Act

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

18
30
62
77
85
110
111
163
185
196
201
243
383
406
410
412
431
447

Regular Session of 1964
Yes
Act No. 463
Yes
Act No. 466
Yes
Act No. 559
Yes
Act No. 578
No
Act No. 594
Yes
Act No. 614
Yes
Act No. 676
Yes
Act No. 677
No
Act No. 678
No
Act No. 679
Yes
Act No. 680
No
Act No. 688
Yes
Act No. 691
No
Act No. 695
No
Act No. 696
No
Act No. 715
Yes
Act No. 726
No
Act No. 728

No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes

Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

391
392
393
394
416
436

Regular Session of 1956
No
Act No. 437
No
*Sen. Bill No. 100
No
Sen. Bill No. 1815
No
Sen. Bill No. 3731
No
H. B. No. 1137
Yes
H. B. No. 3878

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

7
24
25
26
36
37
42

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Regular Session of 1957

H.
H.
H.
H.
H.
H.
H.

C.
C.
C.
C.
C.
C.
C.

it.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.

No. 79
No. 910
No. 41 u
No. 422
No. 431
No. 4411
No. 461

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

4. This bill was passed by both Houses, vetoed by the Governor, and never
passed again over his veto. It was not included in the 1956 Acts for this reason.
See Cobb v. Louisiana Board of Institutions, 237 La. 315, 111 So.2d 126 (1958).
5. This bill was passed by both Houses, vetoed by the Governor, and never
passed again over his veto. It was not included in the 1956 Acts for this reason.
See LA. HOUSE J. 2497 (1956).
6. See LA. HousE J. 2515, 2516 (1956).
7. This bill was passed by both Houses, but vetoed by the Governor, and not
included in the 1956 Acts for that reason. See Stephens v. Natchitoches Parish
School Board, 96 So.2d 396 (La. App. 1957).
8. This bill was passed by both Houses, but vetoed by the Governor, and not
included in the 1956 Acts for that reason. See Duree v. State, 96 So.2d 854 (La.
App. 1957).
9. See LA. SENATE J. 39, 40 (1957).
10. See Id., pp. 40-42.
11. See Id., pp. 152, 153.
12. See Id., pp. 153, 154.
13. See Id., pp. 154, 155.
14. See Id., pp. 130, 131.
15. See Id., pp. 162, 163.
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TABLED 2Authorization:

H. C. R. No. 53U

Restrictive
Section:

No

Continued
Restrictive
Section:

Authorization:

H. C. R. No. 5517

Yes

Regular Session of 1958

Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
*Act
Act
Act
*Act
*Act
*Act
*Act
*Act
*Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

10
14
30
42
48
59
60
66
73
122
127
138
139
140
141
142
143
148
155
159
162
182
189
203
214
230
236
237
245
282
283
290

*Act No.
Act No.
Act No.
Act No.
Act'No.
Act No.
Act No.
Act No.
Act No.

11
15
16
17
20
82
89
101
102

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No

Act No. 293
Act No. 294
Act No. 305
Act No. 320
Act No. 321
Act No. 329
*Act No. 355
Act No. 364
Act No. 371
Act No. 378
Act No. 396
Act No. 426
Act No. 430
Act No. 445
Act No. 459
Act No. 461
Act No. 466
Act No. 467
Act No. 484
Act No. 487
Act No. 488
Act No. 489
Act No. 494,
Act No. 502
Act No. 505
S. C. R. No.
S. C. R. No.
S. C. R. No.
H. C. R. No.
H. C. R. No.
H. C. R. No.

Regular Session of 1959"'

No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Act No. 106
Act No. 111
Act No. 112
Act No. 121
Act No. 122
S. C. R. No.
*H. C. R. No.
H. C. R. No.
H. C. R. No.

281
5"
9
25s

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No

16. See Id., pp. 238, 239.
17. See Id., pp. 239, 240.
18. See LA. HOUSE J. 984-986 (1958).
19. See Id., pp. 1984, 1985.
20. See Id., pp. 2040, 2041.
21. See LA. SENATE J. 971, 972 (1958).
22. See Id., pp. 1076, 1077.
23. See Id., pp. 1613, 1614.
24. The 1959 Acts had not been printed and distributed at the time this research
was. done.
25. See LA. HousE J. 278, 279 (1959).
26. See LA. SENATE J. 79 (1959).
27. See Id., p. 71.
28. See Id., pp. 206, 207.
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Authorization:
H. C. R. No. 3321
H. C. R. No. 34W
29.
30.
31.
32.

See
See
See
See

Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,

ontinued
Restrictive

Restrictive

Section:
No
No

Authorization:

H. C. R. No. 451
H. C. R. No. 460

Section:
No
Yes

pp. 169, 170.
pp. 170, 171.
p. 543.
p. 544.
TABLE 3

LIST OF LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATIONS SINCE 19481 TO PAY
JUDGMENTS2 AGAINST THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
A.ct' No.:

201 of
205 of
206 of
209) of
33O) of
49( of
491 of
377F of
547 of
548i of
5499 of
55( of
555 of
55 6 of
17 3 of
192 of
194 of
19 9 of
204 of
2077 of
20 8 of
23'7 of
244I of
3& of
5 of
2' 4 of
2 5 of
477 of

1948
1948
1948
1948
1948
1948
1948
1950
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1954
1954
1954
1954
1954
1954
1954
1954
1954
1954
1955
1955
1955
1955

Tort

Claims:
$ 250.00
443.00
100.00

Other

Claims:
$
45,765.06

344.03
2,025.52
1,246.00
4,258.82
6,465.51
13,112.08
3,756.34
21,488.40
29,500.00
6,000.00
28,500.00
50,000.00
9,420.00
10,000.00
8,000.00
9,500.00
800.00
30,000.00
12,000.00
897,465.72
6,000.00
11,977.50
80,184.19
14.000.00

Act No.:
94 of 1955
95 of 1955
99 of 1955
100 of 1955
223 of 1956
508 of 1956
24 of 1959
30 of 1959
31 of 1959
32 of 1959
33 of 1959
34 of 1959
35 of 1959
36 of 1959
53 of 1959
59 of 1959
64 of 1959
74 of 1959
84 of 1959
85 of 1959
88 of 1959
90 of 1959
91 of 1959
92 of 1959
128 of 1959
129 of 1959
130 of 1959
132 of 1959

Tort

Claims:

Oth er

Claimas:
1,666 .66
2,666 .66

750.00
500.00
3,500.00
2,000 .00
2,461.00
3,000.00
250.00
1,500.00
750.00
750.00
750.00
5,000.00
15,625.00
800.00
2,461.00
3,000.00
1,351 .36
915.00
9,500.00
7,000.00
2,834.00
2,138.00
20,457.00
17,000.00
16,500.00
21,000.00
$465,063.37 $983,66 4.48

Total amount of judgments on non-tort claims, 1948-1959, both inclusive $983,664.48
Less amount of Jefferson Sulphur Co. judgment
897,465.72
Total amount of judgments on tort claims, 1948-1959, both inclusive

$ 86,198.76
$465,063.37

1. Appropriation bills to pay judgments against the State were introduced in
1957, but were never passed, probably because of an insufficiency of funds. No
judgments against the State were paid in 1958. Senate Concurrent Resolution
No. 41 of 1958 promised the payment thereof as soon as funds were available.
2. Exclusive of interest and court costs on some judgments.

